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TAB 1 
VOIR DIRE TESTIMONY OF WENDY MAYEDA 
very good job and entailed a lot of sitting. And like I 
say, my doctor says— 
THE COURT: I don't want to impose the possibility 
of inflicting any physical harm on this possible juror, 
Mr. Van Sciver. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: I have no objections, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right with you? 
MR. MORGAN: Yes, your Honor. I agree. 
THE COURT: I think under the circumstances, we 
won't impose on you in this case and I111 excuse you at 
this time. 
MR. WIGGINS: All right, sir. 
THE COURT: I appreciate your coming. 
MR. WIGGINS: I won't have to come back Friday? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: Thank you. 
MR. WIGGINS: Thank you. I appreciate it. 
(Whereupon, a recess was taken at this time.) 
THE COURT: I believe the bailiff indicated to me 
yesterday that you had some concerns that you wanted to 
voice privately. 
MS. MAYEDA: Yeah. I'm going through a separation! 
right :u>w. We're not married, we just lived together. And 
I'm just having a really hard time with trying to deal with 
all that; and then trying to deal with this and concentrate 
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on this, too. And I just wanted to bring that to your 
attention and let you know. 
THE COURT: Well, of course, this is a very, very 
important matter, as you can well understand. 
MS. MAYEDA: Yes. 
THE COURT: It's a problem that somebody, either 
you or somebody like you, is going to have to spend some 
time on this jury, and both the State and Mr. Alvarez are 
entitled to have somebody pay attention to the evidence in 
this case and to do the best job they can. All of us in 
life, unfortunately, have to go through personal crises as 
well as do other things that are required of them during 
the coir sc of their life, and believe me when I tell you thai 
I know ', hat it's difficult to do these things. I know that 
you have to do it, because I've just recently gone through 
the same kind of situation, where, in my personal life, 
there was a tremendous crisis and I still had to come down 
here anc! continue to function. I don't mean to belittle 
your problems, but we do need your services and that you 
would need to be able to apply your attention and your 
best efforts to help us solve this case. 
MS. MAYEDA: Yes. I would try. 
THE COURT: Sure you would. In this case, 
Mr. Alvarez is charged with two counts of first-degree ' 
murder. If the jury found him not guilty of either of those 
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counts, or if you found him guilty only of a lesser charge, 
then the jury's function would be concluded and it would 
be up to the Court to sentence, if the sentence is appro-
priate. 
On the other hand, if the jury found him guilty of 
either of those two first-degree homicides, then the jury 
would have evidence submitted to it of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances. And do you understand what I am 
saying when I talk about aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances? 
MS. MAYEDA: You mean intentional or— 
THE COURT: Well, things of that sort; in other 
words, things that would make the commission of the murder 
more heinous, more wrongful, more egregious? Do you 
understand? And the mitigating circumstances would be 
things which make it less that way. And only if the State 
could prove beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury would 
have to find unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances; and that the death penalty was the only appropriate 
penalty. The jury has to find both of those provisions or 
they do not bring in the death penalty. You would have to 
impose life imprisonment instead. 
How do you feel about the death penalty in this 
case? Do you have any ideas or ever thought about it, or 
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1 how you feei about it? 
2 MS. MAYEDA: I just feel I don't have any right 
3 to really judge or to really say if this person should be 
4 allowed to die or to live. I mean that's—that's a pretty 
5 big decision for—I mean —even though the evidence — I 
6 don't real!/ feel that anybody really deserves to die. 
7 That's a lo; , and that's really hard for me to— 
8 THE COURT: Let me ask it this way. 
9 MS. MAYEDA: --to say— 
10 • THE COURT: I understand it's a momentous and a 
11 terrific burden. But let me put it to you this way: I 
12 would instruct you after you have heard the aggravating and 
13 mitigating evidence, I would instruct you that the jury 
14 must unanimously find, and that means every juror would. 
15 have to agree to the verdict, that the State has proved 
16 beyond a reasonable doubt and that's the standard that I 
17 read to you yesterday. 
18 MS. MAYEDA: Uh huh (affirmative). 
19 I THE COURT: First, that the aggravating circum-
20 stances outweighed the mitigating circumstances; and second, 
21 that death is the only appropriate penalty. 
22 Now, if you found in your own mind that the State 
23 proved that beyond a reasonable doubt, would you be able to 
24 vote for th" death penalty? 
25 MS. MAYEDA: I don't know. That's pretty hard— 
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1 pretty hard decision. 
2 THE COURT: Well, it's a hard decision. What I 
3 am saying is, assuming that you were convinced beyond a 
4 reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances out-
5 weighed the mitigating circumstances and that in your opinioji 
6 beyond a reasonable doubt, the death penalty was the only 
7 appropriate penalty? could you then vote for the death 
8 penalty, if you were so convinced? 
9 M S . MAYEDA: I don't know even if I was convinced 
JO I could sti l.l--you know—I just —even if I was convinced, 
11 it's still hard for me to say yes, this is what—this is the 
12 alternative for this person, I mean. 
13 THE COURT: I know it's hard to do, but could you 
14 do it if you were so convinced, and keep in mind, I'm saying 
15 that you're convinced to start with. 
16 MS. MAYEDA: Gosh! This is such a hard question. 
17 THE COURT: Well, let me ask you another 
18 question. If you were convinced that the State had not 
19 proved beyond a reasonable doubt, either that the aggravat-
20 ing circumstances outweigh the mitigating, or that the 
21 death penalty was the only appropriate penalty, or they 
22 hadn't proved either of those two propositions, would you 
23 then be able to vote for life imprisonment as opposed to 
24 the death penalty? 
25 MS. MAYEDA: Probably more so than the death 
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penalty. Yeah. That's just— 
THE COURT: Well, the standard is higher to be 
required or to allow you to vote for the death penalty. 
The standard is higher because you've got to be convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of both of those propositions. 
But in order to impose instead of the death penalty, the 
life imprisonment, you don't have to be convinced. You 
can be convinced that either one, or both, or neither has 
been proven, so you see, it's obviously to get to the life 
penalty and I'm not sure we've satisfactorily answered the 
question. 
Do you think that you could impose the death 
penalty if you were convinced that the State had met its 
burden of proof in those two regards? 
MS. MAYEDA: I don't think so. I mean, I can see 
whatever the evidence is and, you know, whatever they find 
him guilty of or anything, I can see for him, you know, 
painful paying for what he did, and for me to judge for him 
to have the death penalty, I don't think I could do that, 
to be honest with you. That's pretty hard. 
MR. MORGAN: May I? You recall the question, the 
Judge said would you follow the law as he instructed you? 
MS. MAYEDA: Yeah. I understand the Judge. 
MR. MORGAN: Well, we'll be telling you that that14 
the law and that if you're convinced beyond a reasonable 
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MAYEDA: 
COURT: 
the law and that's what you would 
oath as a juror, you understand that? 
Yeah. 
And you understand that you would be 
the Court's instruction? 
MAYEDA: Yes. I guess I don't have a choice. 
would have to, I guess. 
THE 
MS. 
even though I 
COURT: 
MAYEDA: 
feel di 
So you would impose the death penalty? 
I don't have much choice. I mean, 
fferently about it, I mean, if that's 
what I have to do, that's—you know—it's just— j 
THE COURT: Would it be that you had to do that 
because the Judge told you to do that, or because of the 
evidence? 
really h.i 
right to 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
MAYEDA: 
COURT: 
MAYEDA: 
rd for mc to 
THE 
MS. 
COURT: 
MAYEDA: 
Because of the evidence. 
So you could apply that standard? 
I guess I would have to. It's 
say. 
It's a very difficult question. 
I mean—I didn't feel I have the 
judge whether anyone has the right to live or to 
be in prison or anything. I mean, I don't feel like I have-H 
I mean, I know that's what I would have to if that's—if I 
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was picked for the jury with the evidence and everything. 
It's just the death penalty just seems so much for me* 
THE COURT: I understand. Do you have strong 
religious beliefs? 
MS. MAYEDA: Uh—yeah. I am religious, but I'm 
not anything really to have to do with that. 
THE COURT: Nothing in religion that would prevent 
you from imposing the death penalty? 
MS. MAYEDA: No. 
THE COURT: Are you telling me then that you would 
be able to follow the instructions that the Court gave in 
regard to the imposition of the death penalty if you were 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence, that 
that is what you should do? 
MS. MAYEDA: Yes, because I have to follow the 
law. Doesn't leave me much choice. 
THE COURT: That's right. 
MS. MAYEDA: Doesn't leave me any choice. 
THE COURT: And once you've become convinced and 
that you have been satisfied with the evidence, that's your 
choice and that the Court wouldn't ever instruct you about 
that, or that you should or should not believe any evidence 
or how you would weigh it. That's your function as a juror. 
MS. MAYEDA: Yeah. I understand just--
THE COURT: All right. If the jury who convicts 
243 
' Mr, Alvarez of first-degree murder, would you be able to 
2 J consider voting for a sentence less than death? 
MS. MAYEDA: Yes. 3 
4
 THE COURT: That is life imprisonment? Is life 
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in prison a severe penalty, to your way of thinking? 
MS. MAYEDA: Yes. 
THE COURT: Would you vote for the death penalty 
in order to insure no release from prison ever occurred? 
MS. MAYEDA: No. 
'0 1 THE COURT: Do you believe that a life sentence 
" can accomplish the goal of preventing repeated criminal 
12 activities by a defendant in the same way as the death 
'3 penalty? 
14
 MS. MAYEDA: That!s kind of a—can you explain 
15
 I that to me? 
THE COURT: Yeah. Do you think that the goal of 
preventing reoccurring criminal acts by an individual can 
be accomplished by a life imprisonment and accomplish the 
same goal as the death penalty if it were imposed to 
prevent that kind of activity? 
MS. MAYEDA: I think life imprisonment better 
than the death penalty. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you believe that a person 
can change and become a better person over time, particularly 
with the aid of professional help? 
244 
, I MS. MAYEDA: Yes. I do. 
2 J THE COURT: If you were on this jury and the jury 
j J were to go into the penalty phase and the jury either did or 
4 did not impose a death penalty and it came down either way, 
c I would you be concerned about any criticism that people 
g I might make about the jury's decision? 
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MS. MAYEDA: No. 
THE COURT: I don !t think we need to ask the last 8 
^ I question. Have you heard or seen anything about this case 
prior to this time, other than yesterday? 
MS. MAYEDA: No. I hadn't heard anything. I had 
heard something on the radio this morning and that was it. 
I hadn't heard anything else. 
THE COURT: Anything you have heard, could you 
put aside and try this case only on the evidence that is 
brought into Court and admitted by the Court? 
MS. MAYEDA: Yes. 
]g I THE COURT: If the evidence suggested or showed 
mg that the defendant was a member of a gang, would that fact 
2Q alone, cause you to be biased against him? 
MS. MAYEDA: No. No. 
THE COURT: Any questions? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: I'm satisfied, your Honor. 
MR. MORGAN: I am as well, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Very well. Thank you very much. Be 
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1 I sure and come back Friday at 2:00 o'clock. Remember my 
2 admonition. Don't discuss this case and so on. 
3 MS. MAYEDA: Thank you. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Carlson? 
5 MR. CARLSON: Yes, sir. 
g THE COURT: In this case, Mr. Alvarez is charged 
7 with two counts of first-degree murder. If the jury, during 
8 the trial phase of this case, found him not guilty of both 
9 of those counts, or if they find him guilty only of a 
10 lesser count, then the jury's function will be over and it 
11 would be up to the Court to impose any sentence that might 
12 be imposed. 
13 And if the jury found him guilty of either of the 
14 two first-degree murder counts, however, then after that 
15 verdict is rendered, the jury will hear evidence regarding 
16 aggravating and mitigating circumstances; and you would 
17 receive an instruction after you have heard that evidence, 
18 that if the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigat-
19 ing circumstances, and if the death penalty is found by 
20 the jury to be the only appropriate penalty, and the State 
21 has the- duty of proving those two propositions to you 
22 beyond a reasonable doubt. Only in that instance could you 
23 impose the death penalty, do you understand that? 
24 MR. CARLSON: Yes. 
25 I THE COURT: Could you follow that instruction to 
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TAB 2 
VOIR DIRE TESTIMONY OF ANNIE SANCHEZ 
THE COURT: Would you be willing to try this case 
solely on the evidence that comes in at the time of trial? 
MS. RUSSELL: I would have to, because that's all 
I would know right now. 
THE COURT: If it was shown or suggested by the 
evidence during trial that Mr. Alvarez was a member of a 
gang, would that fact, alone, cause you to be biased and 
prejudiced against him? 
MS. RUSSELL: Uh—not really. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Morgan? 
MR. MORGAN: Mo questions. 
MR. VAN SCIVER: I have none. 
THE COURT: Very well. You may be excused and 
would you come back tomorrow at 2:00 and we'll pick the 
jury then. 
MS. RUSSELL: Thank you for seeing me. 
THE COURT: Goodbye. 
(Whereupon, the noon recess was taken.) 
2:00 p.m. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Sanchez, how are you? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Fine. How are you? 
THE COURT: I am fine. 
In this case, the defendant, Mr. Alvarez, is 
charged with two counts of first-degree murder and if the 
jury found him not quilty of either of those counts, then 
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sentencing would be left to the Court. 
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penalty 
On the other hand, if the jury found Mr. Alvarez 
f either or both charges of first degree murder, 
be up to the jury to impose the penalty; the 
to be either the death sentence or life imprisonmentL 
Additional evidence as to aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances—do you understand that, about aggravating 
and miti 
surround 
inc1lnod 
c ireurnst 
murder w 
the deat 
prison. 
i evidence 
gating circumstances? Let me explain it to you. 
Aggravating circumstances are those circumstances 
ing the murder which would cause you to be more 
to impose the death penalty. And mitigating 
;mces would be those circumstances surrounding the 
lich would cause you to be less inclined to impose 
i penalty and more inclined to impose life in 
Do you understand? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, after you had had that 
before you, the Court would instruct you that the 
death penalty could be imposed by the jury only after the 
jury unanimously, that is all the members of the jury, 
found that the State had proved to each juror's satisfaction 
and beyond a reasonable doubt, two circumstances: First, 
that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances; and second, that death is the only appropriate 
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penalty* And only if the jury, and all of them—every 
individual found that beyond a reasonable doubt, that they 
were convinced that those two propositions were true and 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, would you be able to 
impose the death penalty. Otherwise, you would be obligated 
to impose life imprisonment. 
Do you understand that? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you have any Teelings 
about the death penalty? 
MS. SANCHEZ: No. 
THE COURT: If, in this case, after the evidence 
were heard by the jury regarding mitigating circumstances 
and aggravating circumstances, and you personally don't 
worry about the other jurors. Eut you personally were 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and to your own 
satisfaction that the aggravating circumstances outweighed 
the mitigating circumstances; and secondly, that death was 
the only appropriate penalty; would you be able to vote for 
the death penalty? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, in the event you 
decided that the State had not proved to your satisfaction 
and beyond a reasonable doubt either or both of those 
propositions; would you be willing to vote for life 
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1 imprisonment instead of the death penalty? 
2 MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah, 
3 THE COURT: If you sat on the penalty phase of 
4 this trial, would you be willing to listen and give 
5 credenco and judge the testimony regarding the mitigating 
6 circumstances; and if your judgment was that there should 
7 1 be a sef tence of life imprisonment instead of the death 
8 I sentence, would you be willing to vote for it? 
9 MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
JO THE COURT: All right. Is life in prison, in 
U your opinion, a severe oenalty? 
12 vs. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
13 I THE COURT: Do you understand that in the State of 
14 Utah, a person who commits first-degree murder and is 
15 sentenced to life imprisonment by the jury, may, at some 
16 later date, be paroled by the parole board? 
17 MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
18 THE COURT: If you had decided that you were 
19 going to vote fcr life imprisonment and not the death 
20 penalty; would you, nevertheless, vote for the death 
21 oenalty ]ust to prevent the defendant from being paroled by 
22 the parole board at a later date? 
23 MS. SANCHEZ: No. 
24 THE COUPT: Do you see any conflict between your 
25 sitting on a jury that may impose the death penalty and any 
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religious teachings that any 
to may teach? 
MS. 
THE 
SANCHEZ: No. 
COURT: Do you 
religion you might subscribe 
believe a person with perhaps 
professional help, can change and become a better person j 
over a period 
MS. 
of time? 
SANCHEZ: That' s a hard question to answer. 
It really depends on the person, I think. 
THE 
MS. 
yes. 
THE 
COURT: Okay. 
SANCHEZ: It's 
COURT: If you 
You think it is possible with— 
possible with some people, 
were on the jury and the jury 
either imposed the death penalty in this case or imposed 
life imprisonment; would you be concerned that you might be 
criticized for the jury's verdict? 
MS. 
THE 
SANCHEZ: No. 
COURT: What are your feelings about serving o: 
a jury where you're going to have to decide whether or not 
Mr. Alvarez committed a first-degree murder and after that, 
if you decide 
not to impose 
!
 MS. 
I could do it 
1 feel, you kno\ 
i THE 
he did, you wi 11 have to consider whether or 
the death sentence? j 
SANCHEZ: Yeah 
It has been 
A!, fair or fair 
COURT: Do you 
I don't know. I feel like 
really on my mind a lot, but I 
, you know. 
feel it's a heavy responsibili 
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MS. SANCHEZ: Mot really. I mean it is, but I 
think it can be dealt with. 
THE COURT: You think you can handle it? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you regard this as an obligation 
of your citizenship? 
MS. SANCHEZ: I feel it is. 
THE COURT: Okay. You recognize the seriousness 
of this charge? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Your dealing with a man's freedom or 
his life? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And you're also dealing with the 
rights of society to be free of people who commit murders? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
THE COURT: We're dealing with the possibility of 
punishment by reason of the death of the two victims in 
this case, and you're aware of that? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Do you have any knowledge of this 
case that came from any source other than--
MS. SANCHEZ: No. I never heard of it before. 
THE COURT: You didn't, before we qualified you, 
the day before yesterday? 
412 
MS. SANCHEZ: No. 
THE COURT: If it were shown, or the evidence 
suggested that Mr. Alvarez was a member of a gang, would 
that fact, alone, cause you to be prejudiced or biased 
against him? 
MS. SANCHEZ: No. 
MR. MORGAN: One question. Mrs. Sanchez, you're 
21? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
MR. MORGAN: You think you can take a look at thi 
case, and evidence, and put aside any feelings of sympathy 
you may have? 
MS. SANCHEZ: Yeah. 
MR. MORGAN: The fact the defendant is very young 
is that going to bother you? 
MS. SANCHEZ: No. 
MR. MORGAN: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Van Sciver? 
MR. VAN SCIVER: I have nothing. 
THE COURT: Very well. Mrs. Sanchez, you may 
leave and come back tomorrow at 2:00 o'clock, please. 
MS. SANCHEZ: Thank you. And who can I pick up a 
note from for my work from? 
THE COURT: The clerk. 
MS. SANCHEZ: Okay. 
413 
TAB 3 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
ELEMENTS OF COUNT I 
INSTRUCTION NO. l| 
Before you can convict the defendant, Fred A, Alvarez, of 
the crime of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, as 
charged in Count I of the Information, you must find from the 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements 
of that crime: 
1. That on or about the 9th day of June, 1990, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, Fred A. Alvarez, caused the death of 
Don Newingham; and 
2. That Fred A. Alvarez caused said death either 
intentionally or knowingly; and 
3. That Fred A. Alvarez caused said death under 
circumstances where the homicide was committed incident to one act, 
scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which two or 
more persons were killed. 
4. That Fred A. Alvarez did so unlawfully. 
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
State has proved each and every one of the above mentioned 
elements, you must convict the defendant. On the other hand, if 
the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of said 
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree. 
(*C1(M\ 
TAB 4 
QUESTION FROM JURY AND COURT'S RESPONSE 
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TAB 5 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-203.1 (1953 as amended) 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN SENATE BILL 52, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
76-3-203.1, THE PENALTY ENHANCEMENT FOR OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THREE 
OR MORE PERSONS. 
Legislative History: 
Senate Bill 52, currently found in Utah Code Ann. section 
76-3-203.1, and referred to in L. 1990, ch. 207 section 1, was 
passed on February 21, 1990, approved on March 12, 1990, and became 
effective on April 23, 1990. 
The Office of Legislative Counsel to the Utah Legislature 
has no committee reports concerning this legislation. The only 
evidence of legislative intent to be found outside the statute 
itself is the taped and transcribed floor debates in the house and 
the senate. Tapes are available at the respective offices in the 
Utah State Capitol. 
House Floor debates on Senate Bill 52 
February 21, 1990 
Speaker of the House: 
Who's the sponsor of Senate Bill 52? Representative 
Rushton. 
Representative Rushton: 
Ah, this is kind of a surprise that it come up so fast this 
morning, ah, Senate Bill 52 is what's ended up after a lot 
of research this summer on the street gang problems, mostly 
in the Salt Lake County, some in Davis and Utah County. 
Ah, I'm sure most counties that have any town size at all 
will have ... be affected by the street gangs that are 
coming into Utah. There's several reasons why there's such 
a giant influx of criminal street gangs in Utah. The main 
reason is the price differential of crack cocaine. Ah, in 
Los Angeles, crack cocaine is in a surplus or a buyer's 
market. It can be bought between three and four hundred 
dollars an ounce. That same crack cocaine will sell in 
Salt Lake for somewhere around twenty four hundred dollars 
an ounce in some rural cities in Utah we'll get as much as 
three hundred ...er three thousand dollars an ounce. This 
price differential has brought about a phenomenon with the 
Los Angeles street gangs that's called franchising. The 
reason it's called franchising, it isn't a whole lot 
different than McDonald's. They franchise out. We've 
always had local street gangs in Utah. They've been 
involved in petty crime, a social service nuisance, anyone 
who lives in this metropolitan area is familiar with them, 
the graffiti, ah, when I was a boy thirty five years ago, 
there were street gangs in Salt Lake City. Ah, but they 
they weren't the serious problem that they are becoming now 
with the introduction of crack cocaine* Ah, police 
departments estimate that in the Salt Lake valley now there 
are six hundred plus members, identifiable members of these 
California style street gangs* Of that six hundred, it is 
estimated that a hardened criminal core of the gangs, 
generally young adults — the gangs consist of youths all 
the way from nine, and I call them youths, nine to twenty 
five, thirty years old. The young adults that belong to 
this gang are, these gangs, it is estimated about three 
percent of this group are hardened criminals with 
associations with the street gangs in Los Angeles. When I 
became aware of the existence of Los Angeles type gangs in 
existence in my own neighborhood in Magna, and West Valley, 
I become quite alarmed. It's a scary thought when we know 
what happened to the Bronx in New York in the sixties 
because of street gangs. Three hundred and seventy 
something acres of the Bronx had to be literally given up 
from the law enforcement and levelled. One of the most 
vivid pictures of the street gang history in New York City, 
er, the Bronx in New York was three hundred and seventy 
acres of what was once communities, towns, neighborhoods, 
as they call them in New York, and those buildings were 
bulldozed down, every last one of them, because of the 
situation that arose out of the Bronx street gangs in the 
fifties and sixties. Right now there are large areas of 
Los Angeles where law enforcement has given up. They have 
been bulldozed down. I don't think that situation will 
ever come to Salt Lake or to Ogden, Clearfield, where the 
street gangs are trenched right now, but elements of that 
environment have came to Salt Lake. Ah, Senator Fordham 
and myself become alarmed about this in about July of last 
year. We inquired of the Los Angeles County Attorney's 
Office on what was being done to prevent street gangs in 
there, they told us about a piece of legislation in 
California called "The Street Terrorism Prevention Act." 
We brought a copy of that act to Utah, we got a lot of 
literature about it, and we had a bill written up that 
patterned the Street Terrorism Act. But since that time, 
that act has run into constitutional problems in 
California, so we had representatives from SWAP, do a lot 
of research on it, and they came up, the Statewide 
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, in conjunction with 
the Chief Police Association, came up with this bill, the 
groQp criminal activities penalty, which they feel 
confident avoids the constitutional problems of the 
California Street Terrorism Act and will be a useful tool. 
It doesn't have the political or the psychological effects 
that our original Street Terrorism had, because we used the 
term gang, we used the term street terrorism in our bill, 
and they told us this was the reason why it would become 
constitutionally unsound. So, if you read the bill it will 
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not have the word "street gang" in it, in order to make it 
so we're not, the constitutional problem comes with 
labelling people by name* It is, looks benign, "Group 
Criminal Activities Penalty," but this is in fact what the 
Statewide of Prosecuting Attorneys have asked for and want 
for tools to be used against street gang prolification 
[sic] in the state of Utah. Ah, I can go through the act, 
ah, but the main parts of the act at first is it provides 
an enhanced penalty for group criminal activities, and that 
is supplied on line twenty four of first page, "if crimes 
are committed in concert of two or more persons" used in 
this second, the second page describes the enhanced 
penalties, ah, the idea behind the enhanced penalties in 
California and the idea here was to get that center core, 
that's the core group of hardened criminals that supplies 
the money, supplies the impetus for a true criminal street 
gang. We've got to differentiate that between a street 
gang and a criminal street gang - it's a different world 
altogether. Ah, it gets to the hardened core, and the 
social workers tell us that the only thing to do with them 
to allow social workers to work with the remainder of the 
young people at risk in these gangs is to get that hardened 
core off the streets. The enhanced penalty is designed for 
that purpose. Ah, so the second page deals with the 
enhanced penalties. The third page is a list of crimes 
that are effected by this bill and an important aspect of 
this bill that I hope will placate those that are worried 
about enhanced penalties, across this, I see John look at 
me right in the eyes. Because John and I have agreed on a 
lot of things and both of agree that enhanced penalties are 
something that has to be proven that there's a need for 
before you talk about it because a lot of enhanced 
penalties don't do anything more than create problems for 
the corrections. But this enhanced penalty, we have got to 
get that hard core of the street gang groups off of the 
streets, out of the street gangs. Ah, to soften the 
enhanced penalty, if you'll notice on the last page, page 
five of the bill, ah, the sentencing judge, rather than the 
jury, shall decide whether to impose the penalty. We are 
not going to make any effort to take the judicial 
discretion out of this penalty phase. It will give the 
judge the right, if he feels that that individual needs to 
be taken out of that situation for this enhanced period of 
time, the judge still has the discretion to either take him 
out for an enhanced period of time or - him, I shouldn't 
use him - take this person out for enhanced period of time 
or not. Ah, I think that the bill is self explanatory and 
thac it does have the support of the Statewide Police Chief 
Association and the Statewide Prosecuting Attorneys 
Association, ah, the bill came from them as an answer to a 
problem that we brought to them. And I'd stand to ask, 
answer, any questions, ah, ... 
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Speaker of the House: 
Representatives to the bill, Representative Millner? 
Representative Millner: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. First of all, Ifd like to declare 
a conflict because I am a member of a street gang. I 
thought I'd get your attention with that. Urn, I happen to 
have a group of young children in my neighborhood who are 
the siblings of members of street gangs. And, ah, in 
trying to perhaps dissuade them from criminal activities, 
we've formulated our own street gang, and of course our 
intents and purposes are perhaps to be, urn, good for the 
neighborhood, and urn, ah, we tried to take on little 
projects for that. But, I stand in support of this bill, 
but I do want to kind of state some concerns that I have, 
and that it that many times we have failed in our society 
to address in the concerns of our youth, which lead to 
juvenile street gangs, and I feel that many young people 
who come from broken homes and who don'c have the 
environmental supports, or perhaps church support systems, 
kind of fall between the cracks. And so we have a 
responsibility, each one of us, if we see these young 
people, who get caught up in criminal activities, to try 
and become their friends and encourage them to get out of 
that kind of activity and lead them light, and so I stand 
in support of this bill, but I also want to send a 
message. And that message is that we need to provide 
opportunities for these young people, educational 
opportunities and employment for those who particularly get 
involved in juvenile crimes, and ah, so they don't get into 
drugs and other activities. And so I support the bill, 
thank you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Hales? 
Representative Hales: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would like to speak in support 
of this very important legislation. I have a good citizen 
in my district who is in the business of coin operated game 
machines. Ah, he operates in several states, Utah is one 
of these, and he said in the past three or four months, 
these gang groups have cost him, as well as the stores, ah, 
Shopko, Smith's Pood King, as much as thirty thousand 
dollars in just a very short period of time. But he said 
in^addition to the theft, and the property damage that has 
occurred, he has been really concerned about the 
aggressiveness of these groups. He said that very often 
these thefts occur during the time that the stores are 
open, sometimes at night when there's one night clerk on, 
they intimidate the night clerk. And as I became aware of 
this problem, and have visited with more people, I don't 
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think we're really talking about these neighborhood 
children that Representative Millner has talked about, 
although it could be* Ah, they say that these groups are 
sophisticated enough that they know what the state laws 
are, and very often they will move around according to what 
the state law is that handles this kind of theft and this 
kind of aggression and property damage. So I urge your 
support of this legislation. I think it's really important 
and I have my hat off to those who've, a Senator Fordham 
and those who have brought this to our attention. Thank 
you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative, ah, Tuttle? 
Representative Tuttle: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I stand in support of this bill 
also. In the Magna times issue this summer, there was an 
article and pictures about the grafitti that was put in the 
buildings in Magna by different groups that are either 
copycatting the groups in California or members, and I 
think it's well needed and I think we should support this. 
Thank you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Bush? 
Representative Bush: 
Oops. Thank you Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this 
bill and I would ... Representative...sorry, Representative 
Rushton and Senator Fordham for looking into this. There's 
no sense waiting until our state becomes like some of these 
other areas of the country before we start doing something 
about it. I don't have any special horror stories to tell, 
but ah, this, I think this is one of the most important 
pieces of legislation we've had, and I commend them for it 
and ask you to support it. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Prante? 
Representative Prante: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker, will the sponsor yield to a 
question? 
Representative Rushton: 
Yeah. 
Speaker of the House: 
Sponsor yields, proceed. 
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Representative Prante: 
He's sitting right next to me, but I just want this 
clarified for myself. It's hard to ask him when he's on 
the microphone. Ah, the question I have is I'm all for 
what the bill's doing, but the question I have and perhaps, 
ah, Representative Rushton can respond to it, is that when 
it refers to that a person commits a — two or more people 
committing a crime, and ah, such crimes as burglary and 
criminal trespass being those kind of crimes, I'm wondering 
if anytime two people, especially young people who haven't 
learned, maybe are yielding to impulse sometimes, and 
aren't members of actual gangs, how does it impact on them? 
Representative Rushton: 
The answer to these question probably would be better 
answered by a lawyer than by me, but I'm told that it is 
contained in the following paragraph when it talks about 
the concert action of two or more persons. Ah, it's also 
will fall, the problem that he talks about if if just two 
people commit burglary together does this constitute group 
criminal activities? Or three people it would have to be. 
You got the two people and the individual, the individual 
who does this in concern with two other people. Ah, I 
think that the best cover here is in the judicial 
discretion that's allowed in the last page. Ah, and the 
definition of concert action between these people - a legal 
definition. 
Representative Prante: 
Where's the definition? 
Representative Rushton: 
Ah, it's in section 76-2-202. Yeah, well, that's the 
judicial. 
Representative Prante: 
Maybe you could just read the section that's applicable to 
this, Representative, that shows the court's discretion? 
Representative Rushton: 
I don't have my book with me. 
Representative Prante: 
Oh. Okay-. Maybe ah, an attorney can comment on this. My 
concern isn't with what it's doing, it's with, what if two 
people_steal apples off a tree? Or what if two people 
Impossibly, impulsively take something from a home, are 
they suddenly convicted of essentially gang activities? ... 
Ah, I see there is the court discretion in it. Okay, thank 
you. 
Representative Rushton: 
Yeah, that's what I was saying, that, thank you. 
Speaker of the House: 
Representative Fuller? 
Representative Fuller: 
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Call for a previous question? 
Speaker of the House: 
Previous question has been called. All in favor of the 
previous question say "Aye"? Opposed "no"? Motion 
carries. Representative Rushton, you may sum up. 
Representative Rushton: 
I could talk all night on gang problems in my neighborhood 
and all I have to say is when you see a young person with 
the blue skull cap of the California Crips gang in your 
neighborhood, if you're not scared, you don't understand 
what's going on. And ah, this law is directed at the core, 
it's not directed, as Joann has expressed, kids that are at 
risk, you see them wearing the gang signs, their ball cap 
turned around backwards on the West, or they sign each 
other with finger signs like this as they go by. Each gang 
has its own finger sign. Ah, these people that are at 
risk, and these are kids at risk. This bill is directed at 
that core criminal element, that three percent of those six 
hundred gang members that have been identified that provide 
the father figure in these gangs. And they provide also 
the connection the California gangs, the connection to the 
crack cocaine, the money that is fueling this explosion of 
gang activity in our cities and I'd like to ask you for 
your support for this bill and thank you for your time. 
Speaker of the House: 
Voting's open on Senate Bill 52. ... It appears to the 
chair that all present have voted. Voting is closed on 
Senate Bill 52. Senate Bill 52 has received 61 affirmative 
and no negative votes passes this House. 
Senate Floor debates on Senate Bill 52 
January 23 and 24, 1990 
January 23, 1990 
Senator Pordham: 
Ah, Mr. President and fellow Senators, this is an important 
bill. Ah, we've worked on this bill since the middle of 
the summer, worked with the Attorney General's Office, with 
prosecuting attorneys in this state, with other divisions 
of enforcement in this state. Originally, we had a bill 
called the "Organization Gang Bill." In ah working with 
California, who this bill was patterned after, their bill, 
and after they passed their law, we had an influx of gang 
members coming from California and infiltrating into Otah 
and establishing residence here and working as ah in their 
organization as members of, who had broken off from the 
California gangs. I think we need to send a message to 
these organized people that there isn't a place for them in 
Utah. Now we've had, in working with California, their 
problem was that it was so difficult to prove that a 
individual was a member of an organized gang. We changed 
our bill to read "Group Criminal Activity" and it involves 
when two or more commit a crime, then they're subject to 
the penalties that are made in this law. And ah let me 
just read what, quickly if I can, a class B misdemeanor, 
the individual shall serve a minimum of ninety consecutive 
days in the jail. If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, 
the convicted person shall serve a minimum term of a 
hundred and eighty consecutive days. If the offense is a 
third degree felony the convicted person shall be sentenced 
to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison. If 
the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person 
shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years 
in prison. And if the offense is a first degree felony, 
the person shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term 
of nine years in prison. We felt that we need to make very 
restrictrive [sic], and these, ah these charges would be 
administered and sentenced by the judge without always 
going to a jury hearing. It would depend on the ah crime 
that was committed if they had a jury hearing. I have many 
clippings, too many to go over, let me just read you the 
heads of some of these that happens in our state. "Warning 
signs blew up at side of girl's bed," and this is in 
school, ah Kearns. Here's, "Suspect arrested in shooting 
at a market." This is in December 28 of last year. 
"Police believe two arrested teens belong to dangerous new 
gang-r^  "Gang fight leaves three stabbed." "Street gang 
fires on a family, two die." "Spray painted grafitti," and 
this bill covers those acts, that if it's this kind of 
destruction of property is committed by two or more people, 
there's a penalty for them and they're, it's just something 
that we need to adopt to control this. Now in working with 
the prosecutors, they felt that it was very difficult under 
the gang bill to identify these people with the gangs. 
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California, in working with them and talking with them, ah, 
wishes that they had developed their law the way we're 
developing this one in Utah. It would be much more 
enforceable by them. Now I might just show you the volume 
here is the California gang law that they have. So if 
there are any questions that I could respond to, I'd be 
glad to, Mr. President. 
President of the Senate: 
Senator Chuck Peterson? 
Senator Chuck Peterson: 
Mr. Fordham, ah, Senator Fordham, is this differentiate, is 
it the location code a differentiation between juvenile and 
other people, I mean, ah, would your bill apply to 
juveniles under eighteen? 
Senator Fordham: 
It would apply to any crime that was committed by two or 
more persons. 
Senator Chuck Peterson: 
That's what I'm wondering about. I'll have to ask the 
legal people on the Senate, the lawyers, whether or not 
this is possible for us to pass legislation that would 
apply to, that would provide these penalties for a 
juvenile. I just don't know whether or not we can do 
that. Senator Hillyard? 
Senator Hillyard: 
My problem when I read that Senator Peterson is the fact 
that there's three of us here together and that may 
constitute a criminal gang. 
Senator Chuck Peterson: 
That's for sure. I think it does. Yeah, I, there's no 
question about that. 
Senator Hillyard: 
I would say this. The general law defining juveniles in 
that section would override this unless there is a specific 
mention of that and I'd have to look at the law, I was not 
on the committee when this bill was debated, ah, I had 
another conflict that took me out of these bills. I have 
not had a chance to see that but I think that's a 
legitimate question that staff who drafted the bill could 
answer. 
President of tlie—Senate: 
Senator Steel? 
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Senator Steele: 
Thank you, Mr. President, I have a question as it relate to 
ah, relates to a potential in our state of moving towards 
what's termed in many states, "shock incarceration11 • In 
quick summary, as a listing, first time felons, for 
example, ages eighteen through twenty six are placed in 
some states in a ninety day incarceration boot camp 
environment. The recidivism, the impact on those 
particular individuals in the cites that I noted, I've had 
discussion with, seems to be very effective and very 
appealing and our state is looking as possible alternatives 
to what we're currently doing. Would these minimum, my 
question, these minimum requirements, ah circumvent that 
process? 
Senator Pordham: 
I don't think that it would circumvent it, I think they 
would be part of. The judge has the authority to say where 
these individuals would be incarcerated or be subjected to 
review or whatever, as I understand it, the judge would be 
able to put these people where they, where he felt that it 
would be the most good for them. 
President of the Senate: 
Further questions of Senator Pordham? Senator Cornaby, are 
you voting on that one... I don't see any further questions 
then. 
Unidentified speaker: 
I move for the adoption of the bill. 
President of the Senate: 
Question has been called, for the question shall Senate 
Bill 52 be read for the third time? 
[Senators vote orally] 
Senate Bill 52 shows twenty five ayes, no nays, four being absent, 
the bill passes, to be placed on the third reading calendar. 
ranuary 24, 1990 
resident of the Senate: 
Senator McCallister? 
lenator Fordham 
Personal privilege Mr* 
TAB 6 
CALIFORNIA GANG ENHANCEMENT STATUTE 
I 116.9 DfcERINOS PUNAL 60 
Jclivcry; gold, silver, or platinum bullion or 
:oins. and diamonds, emeralds, rubies, or 
lapphiics ' 'Monetary Instrument*' does uot 
ncludc biuk checks, cashlei's checks, travel 
:r*s checkt, or money ordcis iiiailc payable 
o the oi<lcr of a named paily which have 
tot been cmloiscd or which bear icstiicllvc 
rudoiscinculs 
(e) "Criiuinal activity" means a criminal 
WTcusc punishable under the law* of this 
ilnlc by dcalh or tmpitsnumcul in the stale 
l»ti*ou or ffotu a ciiminal nilemc committed 
in another jurisdiction punishable under the 
laws of that jurisdiction by dcalh or luipris-
inmcnl for a term exceeding ouc year. 
Amended Slats 1911 ch 121 § 2 5 
| 186 10 ( (Opcrxl l .c until January I . 
1992) Money laundering/, Punishment) 
(a) Any person who conduits or attempts to 
conduct a transaction involving a monetary 
instrument or instruments of a value exceed* 
log Ave thousand dullars ( I V U X I ) Ihrnugh a 
financial intl i lulion ( I ) v*iih Ibe inlcut lo 
promote, manage, establish, carry on, ur 
lacililalc the promotion, management, csiab 
lishmcnl, or cair>mg on of auy criminal 
Activity, or (2) knowing that the monetary 
instrument represents the proceeds of, ur is 
Icilvcd directly or indirectly from the pro 
ceds of, crimiiial activity, is guilty of the 
:nmc of money laundering lu consideration 
i>f the eousli|uthma| light lo counsel •(• 
lorded by the Sixth Amendment lo the 
' f 116 20. ((Operative until January I . 
1992) Citation of chapter) I b i s chapter shall 
be known and may be cited as the "Califor-
nia Street terrorism liuforccmcul and Pre* 
vcnlion Act " Added Slalt I9MI ch 12)6 sec 
Uutlcd Slates Constitution and Section IS ol 
Article I of the California Constitution, 
when a case involves an attorney who ac* 
ccpts a fee for icprcscitltiig a client In a 
criminal luvcsligiltoit or proceeding, the 
prosecution shall Additionally be required to 
prove that the monetary iuslruuicut wat 
accepted by the attorney with ibe Intent to 
disguise or .nd lu disguising the source ol 
the funds or the nature of the ciiminal 
activity 
A violation of this subdivision shall U 
iumishcd by imprisonment in the county jail or uot more lhau one year or hi the stall 
firisou, b> a fine of not more than two 
lundrcd fifty thousand dollars ($230,000) oi 
I » t i c the value of ihe im>i>cily IraiiSAclcd, 
whichever is pcalcr . or by both lliat Impris 
nomcut and fine However, for a second oi 
subsequent conviction for a violation of lltii 
section, the maximum flue that may U 
iut|Mt*cd is five hundred thousand dollnri 
(1500 000) ur five limes llic value of thi 
property trans teled, wlucbcver is greater 
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, for purposes of this section eacl 
individual Imosictiou lomluclcd shall cou 
slitulc a S(|iii.tte. punishable offense 
Ibis chapter shall icmahi In effect out) 
until January I, 1992. and as of that dale k 
repealed, unless a later enacted statute 
which is enacted bcfoic Jauoary I , 1992 
deletes or cxtcrnl* that dale Added Stall 
1916 eh 1019 f 2. 
I , effective September 21 . 1911, opcrallv 
until January I . 1992 
f 116 21 . |(0|ierallw« until January 
1992) I cglshilltc limlhigi and declai elloi 
l l i c Legislature hereby liuds and declare 
C H A P I t i l I I 
Street Terrorism luifurccutcul and Prevention Act 
|Aao«4 S u n t i l l 4k 11)4 M« I. o1««U«« S«fOMK< I I . t i l l , ft(iu«ii»« »«(•! !•««.•< f 1. I t t l | 
>4M«V« N*I* -*A*««I»* ra«f««i it oh* tk<4 •« *a« r •MomU s««#«» TIMMIMH F..I.N«#MI4<%I «H4 r««M»o»« A«I." • 
M4 M««lSt»l f««.l»U«t. * M «*j.J t» SuU KM <a 1141 M« I. »f«li.« S«fU*U« J| IVII |S«« Cia. C | ttO» ) 
I 116 20 Cilnlion of chapter 
| 116 21 I c|islalive findings *nd declarations 
| 116 22. Participation hi criminal slice! gang, "Pattern of ciiminal gaug activity*', "Crhni 
nal street gaug" 
| 116 22a. ItuihJiug or place used by gang members as nuisance 
| 116 21 Application of chapter 
\ 116 24 Severability of provisions 
| 116 21 l!uforccmcut of local laws 
| 116 26 lienor I to I egislatutc 
§ 1 1 6 21 . Hcpcal of chapter 
U L l i K I N U S P f J N A L §!•« 
that It U the rigid of every person, regardless 
of* race, color, creed, religion, national ori-
gin, sea, age, seaual orientation, or handicap, 
lo be secure and protected from fear, lutiuit* 
itllou, and physical harm caused by the 
ictiviliei of violent groups and Individuals 
It is uot the intent of this chapter to Inter-
reic with the exercise of the constitutionally 
protected rights of freedom of expression 
uid association Ihe legislature hereby ice-
?inlics the couslilutional right of every 
cjUtcn to haibor and express beliefs on any 
if\t,ful subject whatsoever. In lawfully associ-
)|c with others who share similar beliefs, to 
petition lawfully constituted authority for a 
[cdrcss of perceived grievances, and to par-
JLipalc In Ihe electoral process 
ftihc Legislature, however, further finds 
list ihe Slate of California Is In a slate of 
(Itii which has been caused by violent 
licet gangs whose mcmbcia thfcatcu, terror-
it,* and commit a multitude of crimes 
galisal the peaceful a l l iens of their neigh-
eilioods these activities, both hulividually 
ml collectively, present a clear and present 
langer lo public order and safety and are 
tot constitutionally protected I h e I cgisla-
urc Hods that there aic neatly 600 criminal 
licet gangs operating In California, and lhat 
be number of gaua related murders Is in-
resting I h e legislature also finds that in 
AH Angeles County alone there were 121 
•ng related murders lu 1916, and lhat gang 
oiuJcldca In 1917 have increased 10 percent 
ver 1986 It is the intent of the t cgislatuie 
i enacting lids chapter lo seek the cradtca-
on of criminal activity by street gangs by 
musing upon patterns of criminal gaug 
:tivily and upon the orgaulicd nature of 
(eel gangs, which together, arc Ihe chief 
)urce of terror created by sheet gangs The 
egislalurc further finds that an cflcciivc 
leans of punishing and dclcrriut the criml-
d activities of street gangs is through fof' 
Jturc of the profits, proceeds, and Inslru* 
Icutalilles acquired, accumulated, or used 
^street gangs Added Slats 1988 ch 1216 
c*l , effective September 21 , 1988, opcralive 
itl | January I . 1992 
Y ' 8 6 22. tJJnt of Iwu; Operative until 
tauary I , 1993) rarl lclpatlon In criminal 
reel gang; * T a l t c m of criminal gaug ac l l i -
•{•j/'Criminal street gaug" (a) Any person 
Lo actively participates in auy ciimiual 
reel gang with knowledge that its members 
igat* lu or have engaged lu a pallcrn of 
uiiiual gang activity, and who willfully 
pinoles, fuiliters, or assists in auy fclonl-
isjciludnal conduct by mcmbeis of lhat 
gang, shall be punished by luiprlsouiiieii 
Ihe county jail for • period not to cat 
ouc year, or by imprisonment In the s* 
piisou for one, two, or thicc years 
(b) ( I ) Liccpl as provided lu paiaci* 
(2). any person who is convicted of a i l l 
which Is committed for the benefit of, at 
direction of. or in assoeialiou Willi auy ei 
lual street gaug, with the specific inlcul 
promote, further, or assist In auy I I I U M 
conduct by gaug mcmbeis, shall, upon t 
vlcliou of lhat felony, lu addition and « 
seculive lo the punishment prescribed 
the felony or attempted felony of which 
or she has been convicted, be punished 
an additional term of one, two, or lb 
years at lite court's ilttcfctlan the ct* 
shall order Ihe lm|tosilioii of the mid 
term of the sentence enhancement, md 
thcic arc circumstances lu aggravation 
miltaalion Ihe couil shall slate the icasi 
for Its choice of sentence enhancements 
the rceoid al the lime of llic sentencing 
(2) Auy pcisou who violates lids snbdi 
sit»o in llic commission of a felony pum* 
able by impiisomucnl lu the stale piison t 
life, shall not be paioled until a minluiuui 
I I lahndur yeais have been served 
(e) Auy pcisou who is convicted of 
public oitcuse punishable as a felony oi 
misdemeanor, which is committed fur I* 
benefit of, al the dliecllou of, or in assoti 
lion with, any criminal street gang, with | l 
specific lulcnl lo promote, further, or ass* 
hi auy ciimiual conduct by gang mcmbci 
shall be punished by impilsonmcn! hi l l 
county jail uot lo CACccJ ouc year, or I 
Imprisonment hi the slate prison for on 
two, or three years, provided lhat auy p« 
son sentenced lo imprisonment in the cumti 
jail shall be imprisoned for a period uot » 
exceed ouc year, but not less lhau 180 da) 
and shall not be eligible for release U|M* 
completion of sentence, parole, or auy oiln 
basis, until he or she has served 180 days * 
Ihe court giants probation or suspends lb 
execution of sentence Imposed upon lb 
defendant, it shall require as a conditio 
thereof that the defendant serve 180 da/s I* 
Ihe county jnll 
(d) Notwithstanding any other provisio 
of law, the court may strike the addiliour 
iiuuishmcut for the enhancements piovido I I this section or refuse lo iuq>oic the mini 
mum jnll sculcuce for misUcmcauois in a* 
unusual case where Ihe Interests of jusiu 
would best be served, if the couil spcctlu 
ou the iceord and cnicis into the minute 
the circumstances indicating that the Intel 
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f 116.14 D l i E R I N O ' S l» l !NAL 
•..shall not be • flee led thereby and shall con* 
. liaue in full force and effect. T o I Ms end, lite 
provisions of litis chapter arc severable. 
• Added S u i t 1981 eh 1256 tec I , effective 
September 2 ) , 1911, operative until January 
I . 1991. 
| 186.25. ((.Operative until January I , 
. 1992) Enforcement of local la«s) Nothing m 
. this chapter shall prevent a local governing 
* Unly flout Adopting and enforcing laws con* 
•istcnl with this chapter relating to fangs 
and gang violence. Where local Taws dupli-
, calc or supplement tins chapter, this chapter 
thall be construed at providing alternative 
T H L l : I 
•; • Crimea Against the l'crson 
; Chapter 
• | I . Homicide, f i 117-199. 
.. 2. Mayhem, f ft 203-205 
. ' 3. Kidnaping, ft ft 207-210. 
* 3 5. Hostages, ft 110 J 
4. Hobbery. f | 211-214. 
'• 5. Allciitpla to Ki l l . | f 217.1-219.2. 
' i 4. Assaults With Intent to Commit Pelony, Other Than Atsaultt Wills Intent to Muni 
i | 220-222. 
'. \ - 7. Duels and Challenges, ftft 225-2)2 . 
I . Falsa Imprisonment, ftft 216. 2 J I . 
I 9. Assault aud Battery, ftft 240-247.3. 
•'• 10. Libel. | | 241-2 )7 . (itepcelcd| 
.' | | . Slander, ftft 258-260. 
CeJ Juc id (Rev) Crim/rial Law §§ l$0 ef JCO ; Within Ciimcs |#/# 270 tt $eq. 
. t• I j -
C I I A J ' T i m I 
• • « ? • . 
I t , | ' Homicide 
' § 187. Murder deflncd. 
ft 181 Malice defined 
. J 189. Degree* of murder. 
. ft 189.3. I lurdcn of showing mitigation hi homicide catct 
J 190. rtinlshiiienl for murder. 
* ft 190.03. reual ly for second degree murder when defendant served pi lor prison term 
murder; I'roceduie 
. § 190.1. 1'rocedurc in cn$e involving death penally. 
ft 190 2. reual ly on finding S|Kcial circumstance 
1 190 25. J*cualiy fur murder of transportation worker 190.3 Determination as to Imposition of death penalty or life imprisonment upon flodlnj 
special circumstance; Admission of evidence. 
| 190 4. Special Audiug on truth of each alleged special circumstance. 
ft 190.3. Heath penally for person under age 18 prohibited 
ft 190 6. Appcalt in capital cases to be handled CApcditiousty. 
f 190.7. "Hulitc record*' of capital cases on review 
| 190.8. liapediiious certification of record where death sentence imposed; Typographi 
errors 
remedies and not at preempting the Ac 
Added Stats 1988 ch 1256 sec I , effect 
September 2J, 1988, operative until Janut 
I) 1992. 
ft 186 27. ((Operative until January 
19921 Itcpcul of chapter| This chapter sit 
remain m effect only until January I , 19* 
aud as of that dale i\ repealed, utdess a la 
enacted statute, which is chaptered befi 
January I . 1992. deletes or calends ll 
date. A tilled Slats 1988 ch 1256 sec 
effective September 23. 1988, operative ui 
January I. 1992. 
DEERINO'S 1'CNAL 
s 9 (First of two; Operative until July I , 1990) Court reporter to be present -V* i . proceedings when death penalty may be imposed 
909 . (Second of two; Operative July I , 1990) Presence of court reporter In all procc-
f\h*1- • In which death sentence may be Imposed 
91." ' I'etll treason abolished. 
91.5. Of o i l vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated 
92,1" Manslaughter defined; Kinds. 
92.}. Vehicular mauslaiighlcr 
9) . l I'uuishmcnl of manslauj ghler. 
19)15. Manslaughter couimillcd during operation of vessel; Punishment 
194;" Death must occur within thicc ycais aud one day. 
liscusable homicide. 
Justifiable homicide by public officers. 
Justifiable homicide by other persons. 
Hare fear not to justify killing: Reasonable fear. 
198.). I'retumplioo hi favor of one who usca deadly force against Intruder 
199..:, Justifiable and eacusable homicide not punishable. 
i\\ia Uvidctice (3d ed) §§ 24. 132. 163, JlI; Suriimar/ (Mb cd) Too* §§ 371, $22, 120 
'ft "' 
1 9 1 . • 
fir 
ft 187. (Murder defined] (a) Murder I t 
I unlawful killing of a human being, or a 
us, with malice aforethought. 
(b) l i d s section thall not apply to any 
rson who commits an act which results In 
1 death of a fetus If any of the following 
I ) The act compiled with the Therapeutic 
xmiun Act, Chapter I I (commencing 
uV Section 25950) of Division 20 of the 
:eJl|i and Safely Code. 
(21 "lite act was committed by a holder of 
physician's and surgeon's certificate, as 
fined In the Business aud Professions 
kJcMia a ease where, to a medical ccr-
iiiy, the result of childbirth would be 
t lh of the mother of the fetus or where 
r* death from childbirth, although not 
pdically certain, would be substantially 
ruin oi more likely than not. 
( ) ) l i te act was solicited, aided, abetted, 
iconscutcd to by the mother of the fetus. 
(c) Subdivision (b) shall not be construed 
'prohibit the prosecution of any peison 
dcr any other provision of law. (1872; 
70 ch 1311 ft I.) Ca/ Jur 3d (Rev) Ciimh 
nUw §§ 124, l$0 el tea 197, 243. 334. 
3}360. 3$2. 2014. 2740. 2747, 2$23. 2$3$, 
$3. 3224; U'ilkm Ciimci np 271 el icy, 
9;'Crim/na/ J Voce Jure /»p 179, i$9. 
4'j88.' (Mal ice defined] Such malice may 
tfCiprcas or implied. I t Is en press when 
ere is manifested a deliberate intention 
.lawfully to lake away the life of a fellow 
ttiurc. l l Is Implied, when no considerable 
^vocation appears, or when the clrcum* 
ijiccs attending the killing show an aban* 
gejJ and malignant heart. 
When l l Is shown that the killing re 
from the Intentional doing of an act 
caprest or Implied malice as defined 1 
no other mental stale need be shot 
establish the menial stale *of malice 
thought. Neither an awareness of the • 
lion to act within lh« general body i»* 
regulating society nor acting despite 
awareness Is Included within the dcflnll 
malice. (1872; 1981 ch 404 f 6; 1982 « 
f 4 J Caf Jur 3d (Rev) Cr imma/ f a n * 
li)l el tcq, 247. )$2. 2014, 2301; I 
Cilmc* ri|» 274 el $eq.t 2$9 el se«j; ' 
duie(3d)Vlc*di4U. 
ft 119. (Degrees of murder) A l l u 
which Is perpetrated by means of a il« 
live device or etplosive, knowing •• 
ammunition designed primarily to |«s« 
metal or armor, poisrut, lying in wni« 
lure, or by any other kind of willful, it 
a le, ,and premeditated killing, or wh 
committed In the perforat ion of, or a* 
lo perpetrate, aisou, rape, robbery, Inn 
mayhem, or any act iiuulshable mule* 
lion 288, Is murder of the flist degrr* 
all other kinds of ututdug arc of Ihe t 
degree. 
As used In this section, "dcslruvll* 
vice'* shall mean *ny destructive dct 
denned in Section 12301, aud "capl 
shall mean any caplosivc as defined it 
tion 12000 of the Health and Safely t t 
T o prove the killing was *'deliberal 
premeditated." l l shall not be IICCCSN; 
»trove the defendant maluicly and utr ully reflected upon the gravity of hit • 
act. (1872; 1873-74 ch 614 ft 16; 1949 
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FINDS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS ON SENTENCING 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
B. KENT MORGAN, Bar No. 3945 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v . 
FRED A. ALVAREZ, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS RE: IMPOSITION 
OF SENTENCE AND 
APPLICABILITY OF §76-203.1 
U.C.A. 
Case No. 901901149FS 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Defendant. 
Sentencing proceedings were had on November 29, 1990 
before this Court, wherein defendant had been found guilty by a 
jury of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First 
Degree, the Court having entered and recorded said verdict. 
Defendant, represented by counsel, Robert Van Sciver, 
waived any rights to waiting any minimum time before proceeding 
with the imposition of sentence. The State of Utah, by and through 
its counsel presented facts in aggravation of the sentence, and the 
defendant through his counsel presented facts in mitigation of the 
sentence. 
(;'.<344 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions Re: 
Imposition of Sentence and Applicability 
of §76-3-203.1 U.C.A. 
Case No. 901901149FS 
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Having carefully considered the evidence adduced at trial 
and the sentencing proceedings, arguments of counsel and beinc 
otherwise fully informed in the matter the Court enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES: 
a. The defendant was the actual perpetrator of the 
offense where he personally inflicted numerous stab wounds to the 
back of Donald Newingham without justification and committed saic 
intentional killing incident to one course of conduct and crimina." 
episode during which, in addition to causing the death of Donalc 
Newingham, Shane Newingham was killed; 
b. The defendant has a significant history of juvenil( 
adjudications wherein if such offenses were committed by an adult 
said record would show a propensity for violence and a disregarc 
for the rights of others; 
c. The defendant has enmeshed himself in an environmenl 
of continuing anti-social conduct, through the inauspicious 
guidance and participation in a street gang known as "Diamon< 
Street" as reflected in testimony adduced at trial and as depictet 
in photographs of graffiti and other drawings introduced in tin 
sentencing proceedings; 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions Re: 
Imposition of Sentence and Applicability 
of §76-3-203.1 U.C.A. 
Case No. 901901149FS 
Page 3 
2. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES: 
a. The defendant was at the time of offense and remains 
at the time of sentencing, 17 years of age, and therefore was 
relatively young at the time of the offense; 
b. The defendant had consumed a great deal of alcohol 
immediately prior to the commission of the offense which 
substantially impaired the defendant's ability to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law. 
Having found these aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances to be true, the Court now enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY 
The aggravating circumstances do not outweigh by a 
standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" the mitigating 
circumstances found, and therefore the Court imposes the sentence 
of life imprisonment. 
Having imposed the sentence of life in prison, the Court 
now enters its findings regarding the applicability of Section 
76-3-203.1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
1. The defendant having been found guilty of Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree has been adjudged guilty of a 
capital offense for which a life sentence has been imposed; 
00346 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions Re: 
Imposition of Sentence and Applicability 
of §76-3-203.1 U.C.A. 
Case No. 901901149FS 
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2. This offense was committed in concert with two or 
more persons, including but not limited to the criminal 
participation in the assaults causing the deaths of Donald and 
Shane Newingham by Richard Gabaldon, Manuel Martinez, Manuel 
Alvarez, Tony DeHererra and others unknown, each of which would be 
criminally liable as parties to the offense. 
3. The Court finds no circumstances, in the interests of 
justice, or otherwise, which would justify suspension of imposition 
or the execution of the enhanced sentence. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the enhanced penalty 
provided by Section 76-3-203.1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended applies and defendant is ordered to serve a minimum term of 
twenty years in prison. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, commitment to issue forthwith and 
execution of sentence is to commence from the oral order of the 
Court given on the 23rd day of November 1990 in open court. 
DATED this c3» day of December, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions Re: 
Imposition of Sentence and Applicability 
of §76-3-203.1 U.C.A. 
Case No. 901901149FS 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions Re: Imposition of 
Sentence and Applicability of §76-3-203.1 U.C.A. was mailed to 
Robert Van Sciver, Attorney for Defendant at 321 South 600 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this 4th day of December, 1990. 
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TAB 8 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
o\s flfcT^owi 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
 u ,Qn 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE C O U N T ^ ^ T E ^ R W A H J U 
'A1.01STRJCT 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
FRED A. ALVAREZ 
( J A I L ) -3$]3 
Defendant. 
SALT L* ^OUHTY 
BY -dWCnWfW&NTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
901901149 Case No. 
Count No. 
Honorable 
Clerk 
Reporter _ 
Bailiff 
Date 
T 
RICHARD H. MOFFAT 
KATHY GROTEPAS 
HAL WALTON 
LYNN HUFFMAN 
NOVEMBER 29, 1990 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by jp a jury; D the court; 0 plea of guilty; 
• plea of no contest; of the offense of Cr iminal Hnmirir ip, Murder i n the F i r s t Degr&ea felony 
of the JJLL degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by R. Vansciver and the State being represented by K Morgan is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
MINIMUM 
XM to a)(MMMM mandatory term of . 20 years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
• of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ , 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $. to 
• such sentence is to run concurrently with 
G such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
D 
are hereby dismissed. 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
X X$ Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake CountyXXfor delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
XXO Commitment shall issue FORTHWITH ^ ^ 
DATED t h i s - l i l L . day of DecefUJreT _ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
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